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Abstract
This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international con-
ﬂict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conﬂict outcomes,
whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of oﬃce, demo-
cratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii)o na v e r a g ew i nm o r e
of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complemen-
tarities. The likelihood of interstate war, therefore, is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair),
highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent
with empirical ﬁndings.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D72, D74, D82.
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11 Introduction
One of the most robust ﬁndings in the study of international politics is that the likelihood of war
between two democracies is smaller than the likelihood of war between two countries of which
at least one is autocratic.1,2 Bremer (1992) calculates the historic frequency of war between the
dyads (pairs) of non-democratic states to 0.70, decreasing to 0.18 for dyads of which one country
was democratic and further to 0.05 for the democratic dyads (all frequencies multiplied by 1000).
The ﬁnding that democracies are more peaceful towards each other than towards non-democracies,
extends well beyond the observation that democracies rarely ﬁght one another.3 There appears
to be a general relationship between regime type and foreign policy behaviour (Leeds and Davis,
1999). For example, democracies tend to be involved in militarized dispute (including war) with
each other less often than with non-democracies (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989).
This paper investigates within a game-theoretic framework how nations’ decisions to engage in
international conﬂict depends on the regime type. Two state leaders simultaneously and indepen-
dently decide whether to attack the other country. The losing country is forced to pay a penalty
to the winner. The prospect of additional spending is what creates the incentive for initiating war.
The ruler does not have to bear the direct cost of conﬂict and therefore has a tendency to engage
in conﬂict too often.
T h eg a m ei sa na g e n c yp r o b l e mb e t w e e nt h ei n ﬂuential members of the polity or the selectorate
(Shirk, 1993) and the state leader. The principal (the selectorate) must design policies so as to
prevent the agent (the leader) from abusing power for his own purposes. The principal can use post-
conﬂict reselection probabilities to discipline behaviour since the leader derives rent from holding
1The ﬁrst empirical report on the connection between regime type and likelihood of interstate conﬂict was Babst
(1964). Some have proposed that there is no direct link between regime type and conﬂict. Rather, democracy proxies
some other fundamental determinant, such as contiguity (Huntington, 1989), common alliance bonds (Ray, 1989),
political stability (Huth and Russett, 1993), wealth (Mueller, 1989) or economic growth (Maoz and Russett, 1992).
However, the degree of democratization has been shown to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the likelihood of conﬂict even after
controlling for these factors, indicating a separate role for democracy (Bremer, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1992,
1993; Oneal et.al., 1996; Ward et.al., 2007). Some have argued that political similarity is what matters for conﬂict
(Werner, 2000). For example, similar types of autocracies are less likely to be involved in militarized disputes than
mixed autocracies (Peceny et.al, 2002).
2The most widely used data source for indicators of the degree of democratization in regimes is the Polity data
set compiled by Gurr (1974) and subsequently updated. An indicator of autocracy and democracy is constructed
based on measures of executive recruitment, executive constraints and political competition.
3Modern history has recorded very few instances of wars fought between democracies. Chan (1984) ﬁnds merely
one war onset between democracies in the period 1816-1980, the Franco-Thai war of 1940. Gurr (1974), covering
roughly the same time-span, identiﬁes two wars between democratic states, the Spanish-American war of 1898 and
the Second Kashmir war of 1965.
2oﬃce. Unfortunately, there are no means by which the principal can commit to a policy. The
admissible reselection probabilities are required to be post-conﬂict rational, i.e., time-consistent.
The diﬀerence between democracy and autocracy lies here in the set of credible reselection
policies. In all regimes, post-conﬂict political competition leads to full convergence in the platforms
of the incumbent and the challenger(s). Hence, the only reason to replace the incumbent would be
to punish him for past opportunistic behaviour. In autocracy, the ruler is never up for reselection.
He can be ousted only at considerable cost and individual risk to anyone who purports to do
so. Hence, the only time-consistent policy in autocracy is to reselect the ruler independently of
past behaviour. In democracy, on the other hand, the leader is constantly evaluated in general
elections. Any member of the electorate can cast her ballot in the incumbent’s disfavour at no
cost and is at no personal risk. Since all contestants oﬀer identical policies, replacing the leader is
individually rational. Hence, all reelection policies are credible in democracy.
The democratic electorate’s superior ability to punish the leader holds the implication that
the state leader in democracy will be comparatively less inclined to attack a foreign country, in
the sense that it requires a higher military capability in order to do so. The democratic leader
has to face the danger of being ousted, whereas the dictator knows he will never be punished for
any foreign policy endeavour. Consequently, the model predicts that democratic leaders face a
larger post-conﬂict risk of being replaced than autocratic leaders. This is well in line with the
existing evidence (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et.al., 1992 and 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson,
1995). Second, democracies are less aggressive than autocracies (Rousseau et.al., 1996). Third,
one would expect democracies on average to win more of the wars they start than autocracies.
Even this seems to be an empirical regularity (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Reiter and
Stam, 1998).
A key result of the paper is that foreign policy behaviour displays strategic complementarities:
the more paciﬁc a country is perceived to be in its foreign relations, the less likely it is to be attacked
by a foreign power. This can be explained as follows. Each state leader knows his country will
be attacked if and only if the adversary is suﬃciently powerful. A paciﬁcation of the adversary
is beneﬁcial because war can now be avoided in circumstances under which it would most likely
have been lost. However, the only way to take advantage of this opportunity is for a nation itself
to abstain from the use of force. As democracies tend to be more paciﬁc than autocracies in their
3international relations, strategic complementarity implies that the most dangerous dyad is the
autocratic one and the most paciﬁc dyad is the democratic one, with the mixed dyad somewhere
in between. In addition, the likelihood of war is increasing in the beneﬁt of winning and decreasing
in the cost of losing the war, the beneﬁto fh o l d i n go ﬃce and the direct cost of warfare.
This is the ﬁrst theoretical model of international conﬂict which jointly reproduces four em-
pirical regularities: (i)d e m o c r a t i cd y a d sa r em o r ep a c i ﬁc than other dyads; (ii) democracies are
more selective about the wars they initiate; (iii) democracies on average win more of the wars
they start and (iv) political survival depends on conﬂict outcomes.
Jackson and Morelli (2007) analyse a model in which the leader in each country is biased in
favour of conﬂi c ta sh eh a sa( w e a k l y )l a r g e rb e n e ﬁt-cost ratio of war than the country as a whole.
The main result is that two unbiased leaders always will make transfers to avoid war if they can
commit not to go to war after the transfer has been made. Political bias may or may not lead
to conﬂict, as it makes a leader more aggressive, but will also induce the opponent to accept a
higher transfer. Which eﬀect dominates, depends on the conﬂict technology. The incentive for
going to war is independent of the political bias in the target country. It follows that a democracy
(unbiased leadership) is equally likely to attack a democracy as it is to attack an autocracy (biased
leadership) in the absence of transfers.4 The Jackson and Morelli (2007) model, therefore, cannot
explain the observed pattern of behaviour in the absence of transfers. The present paper analyses
conﬂict under the plausible assumption that transfers are impossible. Democracies are found to
be comparatively less likely to attack a fellow democracy, since democracies are more docile than
autocracies and foreign policy decisions are strategic complements.
Levy and Razin (2004) consider a model in which state leaders are privately informed about the
beneﬁts of conﬂict. The decision whether to engage in conﬂict is assumed to be taken by the public
in democracy, but delegated to the leader if the regime is non-democratic. In autocracy, the ruler
cannot credibly convey his strength to the adversary prior to conﬂict, whereas the democratic
ruler can. Hence, autocracies tend to initiate conﬂict too often. By assumption, decisions are
strategic complements, hence the democratic dyad is the most paciﬁc.
The present paper considers how post-conﬂict events may shape the incentives of the political
4Bester and Wärneryd (2006) analyse the extent to which transfers can be used to minimize conﬂict when the
two parties are asymmetrically informed about each other’s strength. A main result is that conﬂi c tc a n n o ta l w a y s
be fully avoided, even when unrestrained divisions of the surplus can be made.
4leadership. There is ample evidence to suggest that the political survival of leaders depends
on conﬂict outcomes, see the above references. Rational leaders should foresee this possibility
when deciding on policy. If the removal of a democratic leader is less costly than dismantling an
autocrat, the democratic leader should be comparatively selective about the conﬂicts in which to
engage. Since conﬂict decisions are strategic complements (this is derived, rather than assumed),
democratic dyads are more paciﬁc. Conﬂict decisions probably depend both on pre- and post-
conﬂict incentives. One may therefore view the present analysis and Jackson and Morelli (2007)
and Levy and Razin (2004) as complementary, each emphasizing diﬀerent aspects of democracy.
In addition, I derive a few results not found in the other two. In particular, political survival of
the leader is endogenous and depends on regime type and conﬂict outcomes.
Bueno de Mesquita et.al. (1999 and 2003) also stress the importance of post-conﬂict events for
international policy. In their model, the incumbent secures his reselection by satisfying a critical
mass of the selectorate, the winning coalition. The larger is the winning coalition, the more will
the incumbent rely on public goods provision than private beneﬁts for survival. Conﬂict outcomes
are public goods by assumption. Therefore, the eﬀort devoted to warfare is increasing in the size of
the winning coalition. If democracies have larger winning coalitions than autocracies, democracies
devote more eﬀort to warfare and win more of the wars they are engaged in than autocracies.
There are no general results concerning coalition size (regime type) and war initiation. The present
paper therefore adds to Bueno de Mesquita et.al. (1999 and 2003) results by demonstrating that
democracies are more docile than autocracies, all else equal.5
5Baliga et.al. (2007) extend Bueno de Mesquita et.al. (1999 and 2003) to include so-called limited democracies.
In a limited democracy, the leader by assumption can secure his political survival by appealing to a hawkish
minority. As a result, conﬂict is more likely the more limited democracies are involved in a dispute. Downs
and Rocke (1994) are the ﬁrst to view conﬂict as an agency-theoretic problem between the public (the principal)
and the leadership (the agent). The study is partial in the sense that the strategic interplay between belligerent
states is ignored. They make no formal distinction between autocracies and democracies, but expect information
asymmetries between the leader and the public to be more severe in autocracies than democracies. It is probably
true that the general public is better informed about policy in democracies than autocracies due to the existence of
a free press, political opposition and so on. However, it is generally not the public who makes or breaks a dictator,
it is an inﬂuential elite. Whether the autocratic elite is more or less informed about policy than the general
public in democracy, is not so obvious. Garﬁnkel (1994) studies complementarities in military investments across
regimes, but does not investigate nations’ incentives for declaring war. The build-up of military power is important
for understanding international conﬂict, but does not give a complete picture. Regime type signiﬁcantly aﬀects
the likelihood of conﬂict even after controlling for military expenditures (e.g., Bremer, 1992; Maoz and Russett,
1993; Oneal et.al., 1996; Rousseau et.al., 1996). The present analysis treats military capability as exogenous and
emphasizes regime type and the incentives for engaging in conﬂict. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) is
the ﬁrst theoretical analysis of the interplay between regi m et y p ea n di n t e r s t a t ew a r . T h ea n a l y s i sr e s t so nt w o
assumptions which do not seem to hold up to empirical scrutiny. First, it is assumed that democratic leaders
would rather capitulate outright than ﬁght a war on their home soil (Reiter and Stam, 1998). Second, the fear
of exploitation leads democracies to launch preemptive strikes against autocratic enemies (Reiter, 1995). Here,
5The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyses the incentives of the head of state for engaging in conﬂict, whereas Section 4 addresses the
same issue from the viewpoint of the selectorate and derives the optimal time-consistent policy.
Section 5 characterizes and analyses the equilibria of the game. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Two countries, home and foreign, are involved in a militarized dispute with one another. The state
leaders simultaneously decide whether to engage in conﬂict (wage war) with the other country.
Conﬂict arises if at least one of the antagonists initiates it.
The likelihood p(θ) t h a tt h eh o m ec o u n t r yw i n st h ec o n ﬂict depends on the pair of military
capabilities θ =( θ,θ
0),w h e r eθ is the home country’s military capability and θ
0 the military power
of the adversary. The probability of winning a conﬂict is increasing in own military capability,
pθ(θ) > 0, and decreasing in the opponent’s military capability, pθ0(θ) < 0 (subscripts on functions
denote partial derivatives throughout). Military capability is exogenously given and assumed to
be private information to the leadership in each country. However, it is commonly known that θ
and θ
0 are independently and identically distributed on the interval Θ =[ θ,θ] a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
continuous density function f(·) > 0 and cumulative distribution function F(·),w i t hF(θ)=0 .
Each country is endowed with exogenous income I. The incentive for waging war stems from
the winner’s possibility of expropriating resources from the loser. The value of winning the war
in terms of net additional income is B>0,a n dt h ec o s tt ot h el o s e ri sL ∈ (0,I),w i t hB 6= L in
general.6 The inhabitants of the country incur a cost K of warfare, except the ruler who does not
face any direct costs of warfare. As will be apparent below, the asymmetric distribution of costs
bears with it the implication that the ruler tends to wage war too often.
The political regime R is either democratic, R = D,o ra u t o c r a t i c ,R = A.I nt h ed e m o c r a t i c
regime, the leader is selected by majority voting in general elections and in competition with
I employ the realistic assumption that war is better than outright capitulation, and any artiﬁcial ﬁrst or second
mover advantage is removed by the assumption that players move simultaneously. Other models of conﬂict include
Richards et.al. (1993), Smith (1993), Leeds (1999) and Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001), all of whom analyse
state leaders’ incentives for engaging in diversionary international warfare. None of them perform a comparative
analysis across regimes.
6Symmetry on resources and on the distribution of military capabilities is introduced mainly for notational
convenience. All that is required for the results to go through is identical lower bounds θ on the two countries’
military capability.
6multiple contestants. There are many types of dictatorships, ranging from kleptocratic or ”tinpot”
regimes such as Zaire under Mobutu, Noriega’s Panama or the Philippines under Marcos, via
totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Russia, to tyrannies such as Pinochet’s
Chile.7 Although these dictatorships vary in nature and scope, they all share the feature that
the leader is not up for reelection. The dictator can be replaced only at considerable cost and
personal risk to anyone who purports to do so. As in democracy, succession might be a political
ﬁght between multiple contestants manoeuvring to gain support from a majority of the selectorate
(Shirk, 1993). The autocratic selectorate, however, generally consists of a small and inﬂuential
elite. Hence, the power base of the selected autocrat might diﬀer a lot from that of an elected
democratic leader. Consequently, the ability and incentives for replacing a leader might vary
across regimes. Denote by φ
RP the probability that the ruler in the home country is reselected
conditional on the regime type R ∈ {D,A} a n do nap a c i ﬁco u t c o m eo ft h ec o n ﬂict game, and
let φ
RW and φ
RL be the reselection probabilities following a win and defeat, respectively, under
regime type R.8 Write ΦR = {φ
RP,φ
RW,φ
RL} and ΦR0 the vector of reselection probabilities in
the home country and the foreign country, respectively. As the leader tends to go to war too often,
the selectorate could use the reselection probabilities as a disciplining device against the leader.
This might work owing to the value b>0 attached by the leader to remaining in oﬃce.
The present game is an agency problem in which the uninformed principal (the selectorate)
delegates to an informed agent (the leader) the decision to engage in conﬂict (Downs and Rocke,
1994). The principal is constrained by incomplete contracting; the only available instrument is the
set of reselection probabilities. Moreover, the principal lacks the ability to commit to the contract
it proposes. The reselection probabilities are credible only to the extent they are post-conﬂict
rational. Hence, the selectorate is constrained to oﬀering time-consistent punishment strategies. I
assume that ΦR and ΦR0 are common knowledge, although we only need to assume that they are
correctly anticipated in equilibrium.
Post-conﬂict disposable income is equal to X ∈ {I − L,I,I + B}, independently of whether
7The examples are from Wintrobe (1998). He classiﬁes dictatorships along two dimensions: repression of the
subjects and loyalty to the ruler. The tinpot utilises just enough repression and buys just enough loyalty to stay in
power and extract maximum rents. The totalitarian maximises power by creating a highly repressive regime with
extremely loyal subjects sustained by a costly bureaucratic system. The tyrant relies on repression alone. Finally,
the timocrat (of which there are few historical examples) focuses on loyalty to remain in power.
8In principle, reselection probabilities could depend even on the regime type R0 ∈ {D,A} of the foreign country
and on who initiated the conﬂict. We assume that the selectorates cannot observe who initiated the conﬂict. The
selectorate cannot beneﬁt from conditioning the reselection probability on the foreign regime type, see below.
7the incumbent is reselected or replaced. Moreover, political competition in both regimes assures
that the challengers and the incumbent all position themselves exactly at the location at which
they are ensured support from at least half of the selectorate, i.e., the median location. Thus,
post-conﬂict spending is independent of the identity of the post-conﬂict leader. As the identity of
the ”median selector” tends to vary across regime types, so will equilibrium spending. To simplify
matters and highlight the eﬀects of the replacement, all diﬀerences are assumed away. The entire
population is homogenous with disposable income X spent on a public good equally beneﬁcial to
all. To simplify even further, all economic agents are assumed risk neutral.9
The timing of the game is as follows. Nature draws capability θ, and the rulers learn their
own capability. Second, the selectorates in the two countries announce a vector of reelection
probabilities ΦR and ΦR0, respectively. Next, the game moves into the conﬂict stage. A strategy
at the conﬂict stage is a mapping from the set of types Θ into (a potential mix of) the set of
actions {”attack”, ”remain paciﬁc”}, conditional on the leaders’ assessment of the actions in the
foreign country and its belief about future reselection prospects and expected income. Reselection
takes place immediately after the conﬂict stage.
The equilibrium concept applied is that of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). A set of strate-
gies constitutes a BNE if beliefs and actions are consistent: the optimal actions of a country, given
its beliefs about the actions of the adversary, correspond with the beliefs that the adversary holds
about its enemy’s actions and vice versa.
3T h e r u l e r
Suppose the ruler in regime R holds the subjective belief that his adversary will remain paciﬁc
with probability q0(z) as a function of military capability z ∈ Θ. If the ruler remains paciﬁcw i t h
probability q, his expected utility is given by
V (θ,q,q
0(z),Φ
R)=
Z
Θ
[qq
0(z)(I + φ
RPb)+( 1− qq
0(z))(p(θ,z)(I + B + φ
RWb)
+(1 − p(θ,z))(I − L + φ
RLb))]dF(z)
With probability qq0(z) peace prevails, income remains at I and the ruler is reselected with
probability φ
RP. Otherwise war breaks out, is won with probability p(θ,z) and lost with probability
9The assumption of risk-neutrality is innocuous, any utility function strictly increasing in wealth will do.
81 − p(θ,z). In case of a win, income increases to I + B and the reselection probability is φ
RW,
in case of a loss income falls to I − L and the reselection probability is φ
RL.D i ﬀerentiate with
respect to q to get
v(θ,q
0(z),Φ
R)=
Z
Θ
q
0(z)[p(θ,z)(B +(φ
RW −φ
RP)b)−(1−p(θ,z))(L+(φ
RP −φ
RL)b)]dF(z),( 1 )
the leader’s marginal incentive for declaring war. The choice of the ruler matters only in case the
adversary remains paciﬁc. In that case, the upside of war, the income expansion associated with
victory and the marginal eﬀect of a victory on reselection, is traded oﬀ against the downside,t h e
income loss plus the political cost of a loss. The relative magnitude of the two eﬀects depends on
the country’s military capability:
Lemma 3.1 If the probability of retaining oﬃce is at least as large following a victory as it is
following a defeat (φ
RW ≥ φ
RL), the ruler will attack if and only if military capability is suﬃciently
high.
Proof.
vθ(θ,q
0(z),Φ
R)=
Z
Θ
q
0(z)pθ(θ,z)[B + L +( φ
RW − φ
RL)b]dF(z) > 0
by pθ > 0 and by φ
RW ≥ φ
RL if q0(z) > 0 for a subset of Θ with positive measure. Hence, q(θ)=0
if θ is suﬃciently large and 1 otherwise.
The intuition is straightforward. The stronger is the army, the more (less) likely it is that the
war will be won (lost). Since it is better to win a war than to lose it, the value of engaging in conﬂict
increases with military power. Although this is a straightforward, almost trivial, theoretical result,
there is a lack of consensus as to its empirical validity. Morgan and Campbell (1991) show that
major democratic powers were involved in conﬂict less frequently than minor democratic powers
in the period 1816-1976. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992: p.146-147) rely on this evidence
when they propose ”...the seeming paradox that the states most capable of winning in a violent
confrontation are least likely to resort to that means of settling their diﬀerences”. However,
not only were the period’s major democratic powers France, England and the USA,10 military
powerful, they were even wealthy. As shown by Maoz and Russett (1993), wealth and conﬂict are
negatively correlated. Therefore, it is plausible that the Morgan and Campbell (1991) study picks
10See Small and Singer (1982: 44-45) for the list of the major powers during the period 1816-1980 used by Morgan
and Campbell (1991).
9up a signiﬁcant wealth eﬀect. Rousseau et.al. (1996) and Gelpi (1997) use data on the number
of troops and the size of military expenditures to construct a measure of power. Their results
conﬁrm the proposition above: the likelihood that a country initiates the use of force against an
adversary increases when the balance of power tips in its favour.
The fact that the net utility of declaring war is monotonic in military capacity has the implica-
tion that there for any set of beliefs about the opponent’s actions, exists a cutoﬀ point or trigger
β such that a country’s leadership will declare war with certainty whenever military capability is
above this threshold and remain peaceful otherwise, provided φ
RW ≥ φ
RL. In order for beliefs
to be consistent, each player must hold the belief that a threshold exists for the opponent too.
Suppose that φ
R0W ≥ φ
R0L also holds, and that the expected trigger of the adversary is θ
0.I m p o s e
this belief structure on (1) to obtain:
v(θ,Φ
R)=
Z θ0
θ
[p(θ,z)(B +( φ
RW − φ
RP)b) − (1 − p(θ,z))(L +( φ
RP − φ
RL)b)]dF(z).( 2 )
v(θ,ΦR) is the leadership’s expected net beneﬁt of going to war, given its capacity θ,t h eb e l i e f
that the enemy remains peaceful if and only if its military capacity is below θ
0 and the replacement
structure ΦR. For future reference, deﬁne the (implicit) function β
R(θ
0) in the following way:
β
R(θ
0)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
θ if v(θ,θ
0,ΦR)≥0
β
R|v(β
R,θ
0,ΦR)=0 if v(θ,θ
0,ΦR)>0 >v (θ,θ
0,ΦR)
θ if v(θ,θ
0,ΦR)≤0
,
β
R(θ)=l i m
θ0↓θ
β
R(θ
0).
β
R(·) is a continuous function deﬁned on the compact space Θ b yt h ea s s u m p t i o n so np and f.I t
deﬁnes the trigger for which the ruler in a regime of type R will attack as a function of the beliefs
about the opponent’s trigger. The threshold is an interesting object of study because it reveals
the ex ante (i.e. before the revelation of military capabilities) likelihood that a country will attack
another. The lower it is, the higher is the ex ante probability that the country will declare war.
Proposition 3.1 If the probability of retaining oﬃce is at least as large following a victory as it
is following a defeat in both countries, the threshold for declaring war is increasing in the enemy’s
perceived threshold for conﬂict (β
R
θ0(θ
0) > 0 for all β
R ∈ (θ,θ)).
10Proof. β
R
θ0 = −vθ0/vθ. vθ > 0 from the assumption that φ
RW ≥ φ
RL, see Lemma 3.1. Hence,
sgn{β
R
θ0} = −sgn{vθ0}.D e ﬁne two new variables,
C
R =
L+(φRP−φRL)b
B+L+(φRW−φRL)b and M(θ,C
R)=
Z θ0
θ
[p(θ,z) − C
R]dF(z).( 3 )
By deﬁnition, v(θ,ΦR)=( B+L+(φ
RW−φ
RL)b)M(θ,CR),s oM(β
R,θ
0,CR)=0for all β
R ∈ (θ,θ).
Perform an integration by parts:
M(β
R,θ
0,C
R)=[ p(β
R,θ
0) − C
R]F(θ
0) −
Z θ0
θ
pθ0(β
R,z)F(z)dz =0 .
pθ0(β
R,z) < 0 and F(z) > 0 for all z>θimply p(β
R,θ
0) <C R for all β
R ∈ (θ,θ) and θ
0 >θ .
vθ0 =( B + L +( φ
RW − φ
RL)b)[p(β
R,θ
0) − CR]f(θ
0) < 0 completes the proof.
The proposition reveals that foreign policies display strategic complementarities; the likelihood
of one leader being docile is increasing in the perception of the other leader as being docile. The
explanation is the following. Each state leader knows that the opponent will attack him if and
only if suﬃciently powerful in terms of military capability (Lemma 3.1). Suppose now that the
ruler, for some reason, is led to believe that the adversary has become more adverse to starting a
conﬂict, i.e. the enemy’s threshold value for attacking has increased. In the new state of the world
the opponent will refrain from the use of force for some high levels of military capability at which
he previously would have attacked. This is good news. It means that conﬂict can be avoided in
some instances in which the war most likely would be lost. However, the only way the leader can
take advantage of this opportunity is to abstain from the use of force himself. In this way peace
fosters peace.
4T h e s e l e c t o r a t e
The ﬁrst part of this section derives the optimal war probabilities from the viewpoint of the
selectorate. The second part considers the question of whether reselection probabilities exist that
implement the preferred war policy. The ﬁnal part takes feasibility into account; the chosen policy
is required to be time consistent.
Consider a representative member of the selectorate in regime R.L e tq0(z) be the subjective
belief that the foreign country will remain paciﬁc as a function of its military capability z ∈ Θ,
and q(θ) the perceived likelihood that the ruler in the home country stays paciﬁc as a function of
11military capability θ ∈ Θ. Expected utility is
U(q(θ),q
0(z)) =
Z
Θ
Z
Θ
[q(θ)q
0(z)I +( 1− q(θ)q
0(z))(p(θ,z)(I + B)
+(1 − p(θ,z))(I − L) − K)]dF(z)dF(θ).
Diﬀerentiate U with respect to q(θ) to ﬁnd the selectorate’s net incentive for declaring war
u(θ,q
0(z)) =
Z
Θ
q
0(z)[p(θ,z)B − (1 − p(θ,z))L − K]dF(z)
at military capability θ. The selectorate strictly prefers the leader to attack the foreign country if
and only if u(θ,q0(z)) > 0. By remaining paciﬁc, the selectorate saves on the cost K of warfare and
the income loss L in case of defeat. On the negative side, the potential income gain B is missed
in cases where the war would in fact have been won. The incentive for declaring war depends on
the country’s military capability in an intuitive manner (the proof is analogous to the proof of
Lemma 3.1 and thus omitted):
Lemma 4.1 The selectorate prefers war if and only if military capability is suﬃciently high.
Each country thus has a trigger level above which they prefer war. Let θ
0 be the anticipated
trigger level of the foreign country. The net incentive for declaring war reduces to
u(θ)=
Z θ0
θ
[p(θ,z)B − (1 − p(θ,z))L − K]dF(z).( 4 )
For any anticipated threshold θ
0 in the foreign country, the selectorate’s preferred threshold level
β i sf o u n de x a c t l ya tt h ep o i n ta tw h i c ht h es e l e c t o r a t ei si n d i ﬀerent between war and peace, i.e.,
at u(β,θ
0)=0 .11
The selectorate neither has the information nor suﬃcient instruments to instruct the leader to
attack contingent on β. Instead, it is forced to use the ruler’s strive for remaining in power to shape
incentives. The question is whether reselection incentives are suﬃcient to align the preferences of
the leader and the selectorate. Let Φ = {φ
P,φ
W,φ
L} be any vector of reselection probabilities.
With these instruments,
v(θ,Φ) − u(θ)=
Z θ0
θ
[p(θ,z)(φ
W − φ
P)b − (1 − p(θ,z))(φ
P − φ
L)b + K]dF(z)
11β is uniquely deﬁned, and the selectorate prefers the implemented trigger to be as close to the preferred one
as possible: U is strictly quasi-concave in β for any set of subjective beliefs q0(θ
0).
12measures how the leader’s incentive for declaring war deviates from the preferences of the selec-
torate. If v(θ,Φ) >u (θ), the leader is too aggressive from the selectorate’s point of view, if the
diﬀerence is negative, he is too soft. The above expression also shows how the electorate can use
Φ to align preferences. The higher are the post-conﬂict reselection probabilities φ
W and φ
L,t h e
more aggressive does the ruler tend to be. An increase in the paciﬁc reselection probability φ
P
induces a more paciﬁcr u l e r .
Concerning the optimal reselection probabilities, consider ﬁrst the case in which the cost of
warfare is large, i.e. K>b . Assume also that the selectorate has chosen a policy so as to minimise
the likelihood of war, i.e. φ
W = φ
L =0and φ
P =1 . With these reselection probabilities,
v(θ,Φ) − u(θ)=( K − b)F(θ
0) > 0. Even with the maximal punishment, certain replacement in
case of war and certain reselection in case of peace, the leader still tends to pick wars too often.
As the selectorate cannot do more to minimize the risk of war, φ
W = φ
L =0and φ
P =1are
optimal when wars are costly. Assume next that war is not so costly, i.e. K ≤ b. Consider a policy
in which the leader is reselected for sure if war does not break out, and is ousted with probability
Kb−1 in every post-conﬂict state. In this case v(θ,Φ)=u(θ) and preferences perfectly aligned.
We have thus established:
Proposition 4.1 The following reselection policy is optimal: the leader is reselected for sure if
peace prevails (φ
P =1 ) and is ousted with positive probability if war breaks out, irrespective of
whether the war is won or lost (φ
W = φ
L =m a x {1 − Kb−1;0}).
These reselection probabilities are the ones the selectorate would choose if able to commit to the
policy. However, the set of policies is required to be sequentially rational. Under the assumptions
of our model, the set of credible policies varies across regimes. Consider ﬁrst the autocracy. The
dictator knows that post-conﬂict political competition leads to full convergence between himself
and any challenger. Moreover, replacing the incumbent is associated with signiﬁcant costs to
the selectorate. Knowing this, the dictator realizes that the selectorate is best oﬀ keeping the
incumbent independently of his previous conﬂict management history. Reselection in all states
of the world, therefore, is the unique sequentially rational replacement strategy in autocracy.
Even in democracy political competition leads to full convergence between the incumbent and
the challenger(s). However, voting for one candidate or the other is costless. As all candidates
13are associated with identical future policies, it is rational to replace the incumbent independently
of the history. Hence, democracies can credibly replace their leaders and so the socially optimal
policy is time consistent in democracy. We collect these result in a proposition:
Proposition 4.2 In equilibrium, the autocratic leader is always reselected (φ
AP = φ
AW = φ
AL =
1). The democratic leader is reselected with certainty if and only if war has been avoided. Other-
wise, he is replaced with positive probability (φ
DP =1and φ
DW = φ
DL =m a x {1 − Kb−1;0}).
Several insights can be drawn from these results. First, one would expect democratic leaders
to face a comparatively large risk of being replaced following war. This is consistent with ﬁndings
(e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et.al., 1992 and 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995) that
leaders in democracies tend to have a shorter post-war tenure than autocratic rulers. The theory
further predicts post-war political survival in democracy to depend negatively, but the political
survival in autocracy to be independent on the direct cost K of conﬂict. Hence, one would expect
the post-war tenure of democratic leaders to be more sensitive to the costs of conﬂi c tt h a nt h a to f
autocratic leaders. Bueno de Mesquita et.al. (1992) and Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995)
ﬁnd a negative relation between the per capita number of battle deaths and political survival,
although they do not test the joint eﬀect of democracy and cost of warfare.
The selectorate cannot beneﬁt from conditioning the survival probability on the conﬂict out-
come in this model. If war is costly (K>b ), the selectorate wants to minimize the probability
that the leader attacks, which implies punishing him in all post-conﬂict states. If war is not
so costly (K ≤ b), preferences can be perfectly aligned even without conditioning political sur-
vival on the war outcome. The model’s prediction, that political survival is independent of the
conﬂict outcome, is at odds with Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995), Bueno de Mesquita,
et.al. (2003) and Chiozza and Goeman’s (2004) ﬁndings that conﬂict outcomes aﬀect the tenure
of political leaders. The model could be extended in at least three directions to generate outcome
dependent reselection probabilities. First, the likelihood of winning a war could depend on some
unobservable war-ﬁghting capability or competence of the leader. If the selectorate values such a
capability positively, a leader might have an incentive to launch a war to signal his war-ﬁghting
competence. In order to avoid incompetent leaders gambling for a lucky conﬂict outcome, the
selectorate could beneﬁt from rewarding good conﬂict outcomes and punishing bad ones. Second,
14the war outcome might depend on some unobservable war-ﬁghting eﬀort of the leadership. The
selectorate would always prefer the leader to devote maximal eﬀort into winning the war, although
the leader might not. This moral hazard problem can be mitigated by reselecting the leader with
higher probability in case of a win. The third extension can easily be incorporated into the current
framework. Assume that the income loss L of the selectorate in case of defeat is larger than the
corresponding income loss L of the leader, i.e. L>L . In this case, the leader tends to wage war
too often. The following combination of reselection probabilities
φ
W − φ
L =( L − L)b
−1 > 0, φ
P − φ
L =( L − L + K)b
−1 > 0
leads to full alignment of preferences, v(θ,Φ)=u(θ), in the case b ≥ K + L − L.
Note ﬁnally, that the leadership’s incentives for going to war may vary also across democratic
institutions. In a presidential system with term limits, for example, the reselection probability is
zero in the ﬁnal term, independently of policy outcomes, i.e. ΦD = 0.H e r e , v(θ,0) − u(θ)=
KF(θ
0) > 0, and so the model predicts an excessive incentive for going to war in the ﬁnal term.
I am not aware of any study which tests how term limits aﬀect foreign policy behaviour. Chiozza
a n dG o e m a n( 2 0 0 4 )r e p o r tan e g a t i v ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e nt e n u r ea n dt h ee x t e n to fi n t e r n a t i o n a l
crises in presidential democracies, although the results are statistically insigniﬁcant.
5W a r
This section is concerned with the main issue of the paper, the likelihood of international conﬂict.
Recall from the previous section that the autocratic and democratic selectorates optimally set
reselection probabilities such that the post-war likelihood of reselection is independent of whether
the war was lost or won. This has two implications for the rulers’ propensity to attack the foreign
country: (i) the leader will attack if and only if military capability is suﬃciently high, see Lemma
3.1; (ii) the propensity to attack is decreasing in the adversary’s perceived threshold for declaring
war, see Proposition 3.1.
Figure 1 is a mapping of the two countries’ best reply functions. Suppose the leadership in
t h eh o m ec o u n t r y( h e n c e f o r t hR) ascertains that the foreign (henceforth R0s) strategy is to attack
whenever his military capacity rises above y. z = β
R(y) deﬁnes the level at which R is indiﬀerent
15between war and peace, given the beliefs about the opponent’s actions. Thus the best reply to R0s
strategy is to ”attack iﬀ θ>z ”. (z,y)c a n n o tb ea ne q u i l i b r i u m .R0s best reply to Rs strategy
”attack iﬀ θ>z ” is ”attack iﬀ θ
0 >x ”. x 6= y renders strategies inconsistent. θ
∗ =( θ
∗,θ
0∗),o n
the other hand, constitutes a vector of equilibrium threshold values, since ”attack iﬀ θ>θ
∗”i s
Rs best reply to R0ss t r a t e g y” a t t a c ki ﬀ θ
0 >θ
0∗” and vice versa. In view of the arguments above,
the following lemma is obvious:
Lemma 5.1 Any BNE of the conﬂict game is a vector θ
∗ of equilibrium thresholds such that
θ
∗ = β
R(θ
0∗) and θ
0∗ = β
R0
(θ
∗).
θ θ
θ
' θ
) (
' θ β
R
) ' (θ β
R Figure 1
* θ
y
z
θ
θ
* ' θ
x
We are now ready to analyse the types of conﬂict equilibria that arise in this model. First, if
both rulers are convinced that the adversary will declare war no matter what, one’s own actions
do not matter, there will be war anyway. Hence, "always declare war" is a best response to the
adversary’s strategy "always declare war". Consequently:
Proposition 5.1 Always declare war constitutes a BNE.
This is a negative result and if it were to be the unique equilibrium outcome of the model,
the model would be ﬂawed since countries do not ﬁnd themselves constantly involved in violent
interstate conﬂicts. Let a Partially Paciﬁc Equilibrium (abbreviated PPE) be deﬁned as an equi-
librium with a positive (ex ante) probability of peace, i.e. with F(θ
∗)F(θ
0∗) > 0. The following
shows that PPE exist under fairly general symmetry assumptions:
16Proposition 5.2 For any dyad, if (i)t h ec o n ﬂict technology is symmetric, in the sense that
p(θ,θ)=1 /2,a n d( ii)t h ei n c o m el o s sL in case of defeat is at least as large as the income gain
B in case of a win, L ≥ B, there exists at least one PPE.
Proof. Recall the deﬁnitions of CR and MR(θ,CR) in (3). First, I show that a PPE exists in the
RR0 dyad if p(θ,θ)=1 /2 and min{CR,CR0} ≥ 1/2.N o t et h a t
M(θ
0,θ
0,C
R)=
Z θ0
θ
[p(θ
0,z) − C
R]dF(z)
=
Z θ0
θ
[p(θ
0,z) − C
R]dF(z)+p(θ
0,θ)F(θ
0) − p(θ
0,θ)F(θ
0)
=( p(θ
0,θ) − C
R)F(θ
0)+
Z θ0
θ
Z z
θ
pθ0(θ
0,y)dydF(z).
The second term on the last line is negative for all θ0 >θand the ﬁrst term becomes non-positive
as θ
0 converges to θ by the assumption that p(θ,θ)=1 /2 and CR ≥ 1/2.T h u s , f o r CR ≥ 1/2
∃θ
0c >θsuch that M(θ
0,θ
0,CR) < 0 for all θ
0 ∈ [θ,θ
0c], and consequently β
R(θ
0) >θ
0 ∀θ
0 ∈ [θ,θ
0c]
by Mθ > 0. By the same argument there exists θ
c >θwith symmetric properties, i.e. β
R0
(θ) >θ
∀θ ∈ [θ,θ
c].L e ta =m i n {θ
c,θ
0c}. Consider the continuous mapping h(z)=β
R(β
R0
(z)) − z.B y
Lemma 5.1, θ
∗ constitutes an equilibrium if h(θ
∗)=0and θ
0∗ = β
R0
(θ
∗). β
R(a) >a , β
R0
(a) >a
and β
R
θ0(θ
0) ≥ 0 imply β
R(β
R0
(a)) ≥ β
R(a) >a , hence h(a) > 0.M o r e o v e r , β
R ∈ [θ,θ] implies
h(θ) ≤ 0. It follows from the Mean-Value Theorem that there exists a θ
∗ >a>θ ,s u c ht h a t
h(θ
∗)=0 .M o r e o v e r ,θ
0∗ = β
R0
(θ
∗) ≥ β
R0
(a) >a>θ . Finally, F(θ
∗)F(θ
0∗) > 0 by f(·) > 0.T h i s
completes the ﬁrst part of the proof. Utilising the equilibrium ΦR, see Proposition 4.2, CD ≥ 1/2
is equivalent to 2max{Kb−1;1}b + L ≥ B and CA ≥ 1/2 is equivalent to L ≥ B.
I ft h ei n c o m el o s sL outweighs the income gain B,a n dt h ec o n ﬂict technology is symmetric,
a country will attack only if it has an expected military advantage over the adversary. This
requirement of military superiority is indicated in Figure 1 as β
R(θ) >θand β
R0
(θ) >θ .T h e r e f o r e ,
an equilibrium exists in which both countries remain paciﬁci ft h e ya r es u ﬃciently weak. The
remainder of the paper assumes the existence of PPE.
The conﬂict game has multiple equilibria, and so the problem of equilibrium selection arises.
This paper restricts attention to the properties of the Maximal Equilibrium (ME), that is, the
equilibrium that maximizes the likelihood of a peaceful outcome. I show in an appendix (available
on request) that the ME satisﬁes two standard equilibrium selection criteria, pay-oﬀ dominance
and risk-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). Every ruler prefers the adversary to be as paciﬁc
as possible because one always has the option of going to war. Therefore, the ME pay-oﬀ dominates
every other equilibrium. If uncertainty exists about the adversary’s threshold strategy, playing
17a soft strategy provides a higher expected payoﬀ. War can then be avoided in circumstances it
might otherwise have been lost, i.e. when the opponent is strong. Therefore, the ME strategy
risk-dominates any other equilibrium threshold strategy. The following characterization is the
main result of the paper:
Proposition 5.3 The likelihood of war in the Maximal Equilibrium is (i) lowest in the democratic
dyad, highest in the autocratic dyad, with the mixed dyad in between; (ii) increasing in the beneﬁt
B of winning and decreasing in the cost L of losing the war; (iii) decreasing in the beneﬁt b of
holding oﬃce and the direct cost K of warfare if and only if at least one of the countries in the
dyad is democratic.
Proof. I ﬁrst prove the existence of a Maximal Equilibrium (ME) θ
m =( θ
m,θ
m0), assuming
that PPE do exist. Deﬁne the function γ(θ)=( β
R(θ
0) − θ,β
R0
(θ) − θ
0). I ti sc o n t i n u o u sb y
continuity of β
D and β
A.W r i t eΘ∗ ⊂ Θ2 the non-empty set of equilibrium thresholds and Θc =
{θ ∈ Θ2|γ(θ) 6= 0} the complement of Θ∗.B yd e ﬁnition θ
m ∈ argmaxθ∗∈Θ∗ F(θ
∗)F(θ
0∗). F(·) is
continuous, so the maximization program has a solution if Θ∗ is compact. By continuity of γ ∃
a neighborhood N(θ,r) around every θ ∈ Θc,s u c ht h a tγ(z) 6= 0 ∀ z ∈ N(θ,r).T h u s ,Θc is an
open set, rendering Θ∗ closed. Θ∗ is a closed subset of the compact set Θ2, hence itself compact.
I next consider the comparative statics of the ME. I ﬁrst show that any parameter which makes
a country less aggressive (increases the threshold for conﬂict), leads to a lower likelihood of conﬂict
in ME. This result is due to strategic complementarity. All parameter changes aﬀect the likelihood
of conﬂict through CR (see the proof of Proposition 3.1). Since some parameters (I, B and L)
aﬀect both countries simultaneously, it is necessary to consider their joint eﬀect. Compare two
states of the world C1 =( C1,C0
1) and C2 =( C2,C0
2) and assume without loss of generality that
C1 <C 2 and C0
1 ≤ C0
2.L e tβ
1(z) and β
2(z) be the home country’s threshold levels of conﬂict in
the two situations C1 and C2, respectively, given the belief that the foreign country’s threshold
level of conﬂict is z. β
01(z) and β
02(z) are deﬁned similarly. Write θ
m =( θ
m,θ
0m) the ME in
the ﬁrst state, and let θ
∗ =( θ
∗,θ
0∗) be an equilibrium in the second state. Deﬁne the function
h02(z)=β
02(β
2(z)) − z. θ
∗ is an equilibrium in the second state if h02(θ
0∗)=0and θ
∗ = β
2(θ
0∗).
We show below that there exists an equilibrium θ
∗ such that θ
∗ ≥ θ
m and θ
0∗ ≥ θ
m.
Since β(·) shifts upward with upward shifts in CR, it follows that β
2(θ
0m) ≥ β
1(θ
0m) ≡ θ
m
(with strict inequality if θ
m < θ). Invoking Proposition 3.1, one further obtains β
01(β
2(θ
0m)) ≥
β
01(θ
m) ≡ θ
0m (with strict inequality if θ
m
1 < θ and θ
m
2 < θ). Finally, β
02(β
2(θ
0m)) ≥ β
01(β
2(θ
0m))
by C0
1 ≤ C0
2. Summarize all these eﬀects to obtain h02(θ
0m) ≥ 0 (with strict inequality if θ
m < θ
and θ
0m < θ). Note next that h02(θ) ≤ 0 since β
02(z) ∈ [θ,θ]. Thus, from the Mean-Value Theorem
there exists θ
0∗ ∈ [θ
0m,θ] such that h02(θ
0∗)=0(θ
0∗ >θ
0m if θ
m < θ and θ
0m < θ). θ
0∗ ≥ θ
m implies
θ
∗ = β
2(θ
0∗) ≥ β
1(θ
0∗) ≥ β
1(θ
0m) ≡ θ
m (the inequality is strict if θ
m < θ and θ
m < θ).
Turning to the comparative statics results, one only needs to demonstrate the partial ef-
fects. Result (i), β
A(θ
0) ≤ β
D(θ
0): v(β
D,θ
0,ΦA) − v(β
D,θ
0,ΦD)=m a x {Kb−1;1}bF(θ
0) > 0
and vθ(θ,ΦA) > 0 imply β
A(θ
0) <β
D(θ
0) for all β
A ∈ (θ,θ). Results (ii)a n d( iii): Plug the
equilibrium values of ΦR into v(β
R,θ
0,ΦR) to get
v
R(β
R,θ
0,Φ
R)=
Z θ0
θ
[p(β
R,z)B − (1 − p(β
R,z))L − I
R min{Kb
−1;1}b]dF(z)=0 ,
18where IR is an indicator function, ID =1and IA =0 . By implicit diﬀerentiation, sgn{β
R
B} =
−sgn{vR
B} < 0, sgn{β
R
L} = −sgn{vR
L} > 0, sgn{β
R
b } = −IRsgn{vR
b } ≥ 0, sgn{β
R
K} = −IRsgn{vR
K} ≥
0, which completes the proof.
Strategic interaction between the countries has the consequence that changes in one country
aﬀect both countries. However, partial eﬀects are transformed into equilibrium eﬀects in a pre-
dictable manner. Any change in an underlying parameter that makes a country more reluctant
to initiating conﬂict is reinforced by a strategic eﬀect by which even the opponent becomes in-
creasingly reluctant to starting a war. This result is an implication of the peace fosters peace
Proposition 3.1 which establishes paciﬁc behaviour as strategic complements.
Democracies are universally more paciﬁc than autocracies owing to the electorate’s unique
possibility to punish opportunistic behaviour by the democratic country’s leaders. The democ-
racy’s higher threshold for initiating conﬂict spills over to the adversary through the strategic
complementarity. Consequently, increasing the number of democracies in the dyad leads to a
lower equilibrium likelihood of war.
In addition to accounting for the empirical regularity that democratic dyads are more paciﬁc
than other dyads, the model sheds some light on the intriguing observation (Bueno de Mesquita
and Siverson, 1995; Reiter and Stam, 1998) that democracies tend to win more of the wars they
initiate than non-democracies do. As the democratic threshold in terms of military capability is
higher than the autocratic threshold, the conﬂict initiating democracy on average has a higher
military capability than a conﬂict initiating autocracy, all other things held equal. Democracies
o na v e r a g ew i nm o r eo ft h ew a r st h e ys t a r tb e c a u s et h e ya r em o r es e l e c t i v ea b o u tt h ew a r st h e y
initiate than autocracies.
An interesting implication of the additional comparative statics results above, is that an auto-
cratic leader’s incentive for waging war might be more sensitive to the potential cost of conﬂict in
the target country than in the home country. As the autocratic leader cannot be punished ex post,
he cannot be forced to internalise his selectorate’s cost of conﬂict, hence he could be expected to
be largely negligent about it. If the target country is a democracy, the dictator knows that the
democratic leader will be less reluctant to starting a war the higher are the costs of conﬂict. Due
to strategic complementarity, this reluctancy spills over to the autocratic ruler, who also becomes
less inclined to go to war. Hence, the autocratic ruler to a certain extent internalises the cost of
conﬂict in the foreign country. Plausible or not, this result points to a key aspect of dyadic theory.
19F a c t o r st h a ta ﬀect the likelihood that one country initiates a conﬂict aﬀect all countries, not just
the country in which the change has taken place.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has developed a simple theory of democracy and autocracy and applied it to a two-
country conﬂict game in which state leaders simultaneously decide whether or not to attack the
other country. In democracy, the leader can be costlessly replaced in general elections, whereas
autocratic leaders can be replaced only at considerable cost to the selectorate. War is more costly
to the selectorate than to the leader. Hence, the ruler has an inclination to wage war too often, in
democracy as well as in autocracy. The ability to costlessly reward the political leadership through
reselection provides a mechanism by which the democratic selectorate can control the actions of
the leadership to an extent which is impossible in autocracy.
The theory predicts that democratic leaders, for the fear of being thrown out of oﬃce, tend
to be more selective about engaging in war than autocratic leaders and are more sensitive to the
costs of warfare. In terms of military capability, the threshold for initiating conﬂict is higher
in democracy than autocracy. It has been shown that policies are strategic complements. The
perception of one country as being paciﬁc renders the adversary more paciﬁc, too. Consequently,
democratic dyads are more paciﬁc than autocratic dyads, with mixed dyads in between. Further,
the likelihood of war is increasing in the potential gain of winning a conﬂict, decreasing in the
potential loss of defeat, in the beneﬁto fh o l d i n go ﬃce and in the direct cost of conﬂict.
The model emphasizes the importance of strategic spillover eﬀects. Domestic factors that serve
to reduce the danger of a country initiating conﬂict also serve to reduce the likelihood of foreign
conﬂict initiation. These spillover eﬀects have implications for empirical testing. Empirical analy-
sis of conﬂict initiation should control not only for domestic factors, but also for the characteristics
of the potential target beyond estimators of military balance and regime type. Second, the model
predicts that the ruler’s sensitivity to domestic factors sometimes depends on the regime type, e.g.
democratic regimes are more sensitive to the costs of conﬂict than dictators. One should therefore
take account of joint eﬀects in the empirical speciﬁcation.
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